Written by Bruce Coleman
Two ethicists working with Australian universities argue in the latest online edition of the Journal of Medical Ethics that if abortion of a foetus is allowable, so too should be the termination of a newborn. Alberto Giubilini, with Monash University in Melbourne, and Francesca Minerva from the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the University of Melbourne, Published Online in the Journal of Medical Ethics (23 February 2012) were only expressing ideas that have been around for over 30 years! It is nothing new! Even the editor of the JME, Professor Julian Savulescu, defended his decision to publish the article, saying arguments about killing newborns were “largely not new”[1].
In fact, as early as 1972, philosopher Michael Tooley bluntly declared that a human being “possess[es] a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and believes that it is itself such a continuing entity.” [2] His logical conclusion: babies, infants, the handicapped and the aged do not qualify.
More recently, American University philosophy professor Jeffrey Reiman has asserted that unlike mature human beings, infants do not “possess in their own right a property that makes it wrong to kill them.” He explicitly holds that infants are not persons with a right to life and that “there will be permissible exceptions to the rule against killing infants that will not apply to the rule against killing adults and children.” [3]
However the most influential ‘ethicist’ has to be Peter Singer. In 1979 he stated: “We should reject the doctrine that places the lives of members of our own species above the lives of the members of other species. Some members of other species are persons; some members of our own species are not. No objective assessment can give greater value to the lives of members of our species…”[4]. This philosophy that some humans can be non-persons and some nonhumans can be persons spawned the aggressive animal rights ovement and the right to the abortion of ‘non-human’ humans. The ethics’ and enthusiasm of Singer has fuelled both. In 1983 he wrote, “If we compare a severely defective human infant with a non human animal, a dog or a pig, for example, we will often find the nonhuman to have superior capacities, both actual and potential, for rationality, self consciousness, communication and anything else that can plausibly be considered to be morally significant.” [5] In 1993, Singer shocked many Americans by suggesting that no newborn should be considered a person until 30 days after birth and that the attending physician should kill some disabled babies on the spot [6]. What was seen as extreme 30, or even 10, years ago would seem to be now mainstream!
Those who have supported these concepts have logically opened the door for ‘after-birth abortions’. It may be logical, however the basic premise of their interpretation of the value of life is untenable so the conclusion itself is untenable. They argue that we live in a society that, by its actions declares that many humans are not considered to be attributed the right to life, for example, foetuses (as they would call them to dehumanise them) where abortion is permitted, embryos remaining after an IVF procedure and available for embryonic stem cell research, and criminals where capital punishment is legal. Therefore, they conclude, ‘after-birth abortion’ is just another example of what our society should agree is acceptable.
Giubilini and Minerva also use the well-worn example of Downs Syndrome to justify their conclusion. They made it clear that such infants may be considered acceptable candidates for ‘after-birth abortion’ because they may put the well-being of the family at risk, even if it had the potential of an ‘acceptable’ life. Neither author takes the time to mention that as a result of the ‘search and destroy’ mentality of many who use ultrasonography to detect even minor defects in the unborn baby, that over 90% of all those diagnosed with Down’s Syndrome are aborted. [7]
It is always interesting to note that those who propose such ideas become involved in semantic gymnastics. Giubilini and Minerva are quick to note that they prefer the term “after-birth abortion“ as opposed to ”infanticide”, in the same way that Leslie Cannold objects to the term “pro-life” because it [8] infers that the opposite side – her side – of the debate is prodeath – and she does not like to have that label. Why? I believe it is because their conscience tells them that the correct terminology condemns them and they have to sanitise it so they can live with happily with the lie they have created.
The abstract on the website of the JME makes it clear that opinion is superior to and completely overrides the value of human life. It states, in summary, the content of the article, “Abortion is largely accepted even for reasons that do not have anything to do with the fetus’ health. By showing that (1) both fetuses and newborns do not have the same moral status as actual persons, (2) the fact that both are potential persons is morally irrelevant and (3) adoption is not always in the best interest of actual people, the authors argue that what we call ‘after-birth abortion’ (killing a newborn) should be permissible in all the cases where abortion is, including cases where the newborn is not disabled.” Savulescu, the editor of the Journal, justifies the inclusion of this article in his publication that purports to present ‘ethics’ on the premise that “The goal of the Journal of Medical Ethics is not to present the Truth or promote … one moral view. It is to present well-reasoned argument based on widely accepted premises.” Our society has slipped a long way if these are ‘widely accepted’ premises’ and truth is no longer the gauge of what is ethical.
We must ask the question, whatever happened to the fact – and I say the fact – that all human beings are created in the image of God and that any action which takes innocent human life is a direct affront to the God Who created that life. No matter how much we try to ‘fiddle the books’ there is no way of getting away from this fact. It must also be recognised that any flaunting of this principle has dire consequences for all of us. Deuteronomy 30:19 makes it clear when He said to His people, and I believe to us today, “I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing. Therefore choose life so that you and your children may live.”
References:
1. Source: ninemsn article by Ali Best, Thurs March 1, 2012 at:
http://news.ninemsn.com.au/national/8428050/melbourne-abortion
-author-gets-death-threats
2. Michael Tooley, “Abortion and Infanticide,” in Rights and
Wrongs of Abortion, ed. Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and
Thomas Scanlon (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1974), 57
3. Jeffrey Reiman, Critical Moral Liberalism (Lanham, MD: Rowman
and Littlefield, 1997), 121
4. Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1979 p. 97
5. Peter Singer, “Sanctity of Life or Quality of Life” paediatrics,
July 1983, 129
6. Scott Klusendorf on the Christian Research Institute site called
Peter Singer’s Bold Defense of Infanticide http://www.equip.org/
articles/peter-singer-s-bold-defense-of-infanticide
7. http://carijean.hubpages.com/hub/Please-Dont-Abort-Your-
Imperfect-Baby , ^ a b Caroline Mansfield, Suellen Hopfer, Theresa
M Marteau (1999). “Termination rates after prenatal diagnosis of
Down syndrome, spina bifida, anencephaly, and Turner and Klinefelter
syndromes: a systematic literature review”. Prenatal Diagnosis
19 (9): 808–12. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1097-0223(199909)
19:9<808::AID-PD637>3.0.CO;2-B. PMID 10521836. http://
www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/65500197/
ABSTRACT. This is similar to 90% results found by Britt, David W;
Risinger, Samantha T; Miller, Virginia; Mans, Mary K; Krivchenia,
Eric L; Evans, Mark I (1999). “Determinants of parental decisions
after the prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome: Bringing in context”.
American Journal of Medical Genetics 93 (5): 410–16.
d o i : 1 0 . 1 0 0 2 / 1 0 9 6 – 8628 ( 2 000082 8 ) 9 3: 5< 4 1 0 : : A IDAJMG12>
3.0.CO;2-F. PMID 10951466.
8. Leslie Cannold, The Abortion Myth, 1998, page viii